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Conceptualising Multilateralism: 
Can We All Just Get Along?
Introduction
Multilateralism is a poor, ugly duckling among concepts used to study international relations 
(IR).  Arguably,  multilateralism  is  not  a  core  concept  in  the  same  league  with  anarchy, 
sovereignty, or interdependence.  If so, such a result is ironic.  After the Cold War ended,  
renewed optimism about the potential of international institutions such as the United Nations 
(UN) or European Union (EU) led to burgeoning interest in multilateralism on the part of both 
academics and practitioners.  At the time, Caporaso (1992) complained that multilateralism 
was being used to describe a variety of different forms of international cooperation, but still 
was not adequately  conceptualised. His response was to resort to a cocktail of ‘sociology, 
experimental  psychology,  organisation  theory,  and  game  theory’  to  try  to  plug  the  gap 
(Caporaso 1992: 604).  The exercise was both creative and interesting.  But it failed insofar 
as multilateralism continued  (and continues)  to  be used in  a  variety  of  ways to  refer  to 
different modes and forms of cooperation.3  
Perhaps one reason why is that, despite claims to the contrary (Crawford and Jarvis 2001), 
IR remains an American-dominated discipline (Hoffmann 1977).  In IR, as in other disciplines, 
theory tends to follow practice.  Gaddis (2004) argues that only Franklin Roosevelt amongst 
all  Presidents  ever  successfully  ‘sold’  multilateralism  to  the  United  States  (US)  public. 
Multilateralism might be poorly conceptualised because, in practice, America ‘does not do’ 
multilateralism.4
A different, but compatible ‘reason for the paucity of theory concerning multilateralism is that 
there may be so little multilateralism in practice’ (Caporaso 1992: 600).  By one calculation, 
no major new multilateral agreement has been agreed since the mid-1990s (Naím 2009b). 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is now a teenager.  The same is true of the last major  
multilateral security agreement:  the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Even 
it has not deterred India, Pakistan and North Korea – soon joined by Iran? – from becoming 
nuclear powers.
3  To illustrate the point, one recent work concludes that multilateralism is merely an ‘extended policy’ of 
cooperation (Touval and Zartman 2010: 227).
4 Of course, US foreign policy debates feature a rich and diverse mosaic of opinion about multilateralism, with 
leading practitioners (Talbott 2008) and academics (Ikenberry 2006) stressing its virtues, especially in wake of the 
George W. Bush presidency (Leffler and Legro 2008).
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A like-minded view would consider multilateralism to be an artefact of the Cold War.  Interest 
in multilateralism first developed when it came to be seen as a solution to the problem of 
nuclear  proliferation.   It  also became a battle  cry  for  the non-aligned movement,  led by 
Nehru’s India.  The Cold War is now history.  Attempts at multilateral arms control have been, 
on balance, ineffective.  
The view that multilateralism is an anachronism is companionable with one that considers it a 
‘weapon of the weak’ (Kagan 2002: 4). By this view, states that seek multilateral agreements 
are those that lack power to impose solutions to international problems.  Most European 
states could be categorised as such.  Kagan (2008: 42) considers post-war India’s wish to be 
‘the  harbinger  of  a  new set  of  principles  of  peaceful  coexistence  and  multilateralism...a 
European-style worldview before Europeans themselves had adopted it’.
Even the most hard-boiled multilateralism sceptic must concede some basics.  Globalisation, 
broadly defined, creates powerful  incentives for states to cooperate.  After the (allegedly) 
relentless unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration, the US elected an ‘untested 
multilateralist in foreign affairs’ (Delbanco 2008).  Barack Obama’s inaugural address and 
later  speeches  in  Cairo,  Oslo  and  at  the  United  Nations  (UN)  ‘made  clear  his  liberal-
internationalist  preference  for  multilateralism…[in]  dealing  with  other  countries,  whether 
‘friends’ or  adversaries’ (Viotti  2010:  210).   The  claim  that  Europe’s  own  experience  of 
multilateralism can never be replicated is frequent. But it is challenged by evidence that other 
regions of the world,  including Asia,  increasingly  look to the EU for lessons that  can be 
learned about how cooperation can solve transnational problems, albeit with little interest in 
European-style institutionalisation (see Katzenstein 2005, Kang 2007; Calder and Fukuyama 
2008; Frost 2008; Green and Gill  2009).  The EU now seeks partnerships with emerging 
powers with the explicit goal of building multilateralism (Grevi and de Vasconcelos 2008).  
Of course, global demand for multilateralism may be increasing, but major powers may lack 
either the will or capability to supply it.  Cynics might argue that Obama’s America – because 
of domestic political constraints - is no more engaged in building multilateralism than was 
Bush’s.  Meanwhile, European integration has stalled.  Emerging powers – Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (collectively known as BRIC) – act more unilaterally as they gain political 
confidence.  
Ultimately, whether or not demand for multilateralism remains unmet is an empirical question. 
Even the question of how we can ‘measure’ demand is contentious.  The devil may be in the 
detail, with wide variance between issue-areas.  Pressure for multilateral cooperation has no 
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doubt intensified in the cases of financial governance and climate change.  Can we say the 
same about trade or arms control?  
In  short,  there may be good reasons for  multilateralism to remain  under-conceptualised. 
Nevertheless, new, interesting, and even primordial questions have arisen about its role in 
modern IR.  Is multilateralism just a ‘subset’ of cooperation or a specific construct in IR?  If 
demand for multilateralism continues to outpace supply, why does this shortfall  exist?  Is 
multilateralism merely a weapon of the weak?  Or do strong states pursue it selectively when 
it  serves  their  interests?   Are  we  moving  to  a  fundamentally  more  multilateralised 
international order? 
We review 21st century multilateralism in theory and practice, and find that it does constitute 
a distinctive ordering device in  IR.   We also uncover evidence of  growing interest,  even 
amongst  major  powers,  in  multilateral  solutions  to  transnational  problems  that  are 
externalities of globalisation.  For example, the 2008-10 financial crisis suddenly made the 
Group of 20 (G20) most ‘systemically important industrialized and developing economies’5 – 
a previously obscure and young (less than 10 years old) configuration – the main forum for 
debates about how shared policy commitments might restore global economic growth.  China 
and  Russia  both  seek  multilateral  cooperation  within  multiple  institutions,  notably  the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Klein  et al 2010).  The EU is funding multiple, large 
research programmes into multilateralism as part of its doctrinal  commitment to ‘effective 
multilateralism’.6  Academic interest is by no means confined to Europe:  Robert Keohane et 
al (2009: 28) have urged that scholars make multilateralism a major focus of IR research that 
is ‘deeply empirical’ and based on ‘comparative institutional analysis’.
We seek to lay the groundwork for such a research programme.  Our’s is an exercise in pre-
theorizing, which takes the prior step of developing a conceptual framework that can guide 
investigation:
Conceptual  frameworks  or  perspectives  provide  a  broad  language  and  a 
form of reference in which reality can be examined.  They go further than a 
model  in  providing  interpretations  of  relationships  between  variables. 
Conceptual  frameworks  achieve  a  greater  depth  and  breadth  in  their 
attempts to explain reality (Stoker 1999: 18).
5 This form of words is used by the G20 to describe itself.  See http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx 
(accessed 12 January 2011).  
6 The EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy commits the Union to ‘an international order based on effective 
multilateralism’ and ‘a rule-based international order’ (European Union 2003: 14-15; see also Lazarou et al 2010). 
Under its Framework research programme 7, the EU is funding three large projects on multilateralism.  The 
present authors are participants in MERCURY (see http://www.mercury-fp7.net), which focuses on the EU’s own 
contribution to effective multilateralism.   The two additional programmes are EU-GRASP (see www.eugrasp.eu), 
on ‘Changing Multilateralism: The EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace’, and EU4SEAS (see 
www.eu4seas.eu), which will study ‘The EU and Sub-regional Multilateralism in Europe’s Sea Basins: 
Neighbourhood, Enlargement and Multilateral Cooperation’.  
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The need for conceptual depth and breadth leads us to ask far more questions than we 
answer.  But many questions about multilateralism remain unanswered.  We cull the research 
literature on multilateralism, but go beyond the ambitions of most review articles.  Our’s is an 
exercise  in  mapping,  systematically,  a  set  of  questions  for  a  research  programme  on 
multilateralism.  We identify dependent variables that need to be explained so that scholars 
can  identify  what  independent  variables  could  be incorporated  into  testable  hypotheses. 
Above all, we argue that research needs to focus on one elemental dependent variable:  the 
(recent) widening and deepening of multilateralism.  
We begin by examining contending definitions of multilateralism.  This exercise moves over 
well-travelled ground, but we cover it in order to propose a modern, 21st century definition. 
We then focus on the four main factors that condition multilateralism: 1) different contexts, 2) 
different goals, 3) different forms, and 4) different meanings.
Defining Multilateralism
As  the  Cold  War  ended,  Keohane  (1990)  argued  that  multilateralism  had  developed  a 
momentum of its own.  It had increasingly become both an objective and ordering device in 
IR.  Yet, multilateralism at this point still ‘served as a label more than as a concept defining a 
research program’ (Keohane 1990: 731).  
For Keohane (1990: 731), multilateralism is ‘the practice of coordinating national policies in 
groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’.  It 
thus  involves  (exclusively)  states  and  often  (not  exclusively)  institutions,  defined  as 
‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, 
constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1990: 733; see also Keohane and Nye 
2000a;  2000b).7  Multilateralism  becomes  institutionalised when  enduring  rules  emerge. 
Institutions thus ‘can be distinguished from other forms of multilateralism, such as ad hoc 
meetings and short-term arrangements to solve particular problems’ (Keohane 1990: 733). 
Multilateral institutions, by implication, take the form of international regimes or bureaucratic 
organisations.8   
7An implied assumption in Keohane’s work appears to be that purely  ad hoc  multilateralism is likely to lead to 
institutionalised multilateralism, as states find themselves unable to enforce the terms of agreements they make 
with each other (see Keohane 1998; Keohane and Nye 2000b).
8Keohane (1990:  733)  defines  regimes ‘as institutions with  explicit  rules,  agreed upon by governments,  that 
pertain to a particular set  of  issues in international relations’.   Bureaucratic organisations usually accompany 
regimes: they ‘assign specific role to their employees’ and monitor and manage ‘a set of rules governing states in 
a particular issue-area’.    
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Keohane’s definition of multilateralism was dismissed as ‘nominal’ by John Gerard Ruggie 
(1992: 564) on the grounds that it neglected the ‘qualitative (emphasis in original) dimension 
of the phenomenon’.  To illustrate, the preamble of the UN Charter implies that multilateralism 
means ‘establish[ing] conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained’.  Multilateralism thus 
involves justice, obligation, and a sort of international rule of law.  What makes it distinctive, 
and matters more than the number of parties or degree of institutionalisation, is the type of 
relations it spawns.  
For Ruggie,  multilateralism meant  ‘coordinating relations among three or  more states...in 
accordance  with  certain  principles’  that  order  relations  between  them.   Multilateralism 
represented  a  ‘generic  institutional  form  (emphasis  in  original)’  and  implied  institutional 
arrangements  that  ‘define  and  stabilize  property  rights  of  states,  manage  coordination 
problems and resolve  collaboration  problems’.  But  it  often  took  place in  the  absence of 
international  organisations,  which  are  a  ‘relatively  recent  arrival  and still  of  only  modest 
importance’ (Ruggie 1992: 567-568).  
Crucially, Ruggie argued, multilateralism is built on principles that distinguish it from other 
forms of IR such as bilateralism and imperialism:
• generalised principles of conduct, 
• indivisibility, and 
• diffuse reciprocity  
First, three or more states9 engage in multilateral cooperation when relations between them 
are based on principles that  identify  ‘appropriate  conduct  for  a class  of  actions,  without 
regard to particularistic interests of the parties’ (Ruggie 1992: 571).  Cooperation is governed 
by ‘norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relations to other states, rather than 
differentiating relations case-by-case’ (Caporaso 1992: 602). 
Second, multilateralism is based on a specific social construction:  indivisibility.  It can take 
various forms, but in all cases it constitutes ‘the scope (both geographic and functional) over 
which  costs  and  benefits  are  spread’ when  actions  are  taken  that  affect  the  collectivity 
(Caporaso 1992:  602).   For instance, peace is usually  deemed indivisible in  a collective 
security system.  
9Ruggie (1992: 568) notes that everyone agrees that multilateralism is not bilateralism.  But, as Caporaso (1992: 
603) suggests, the term does not presuppose any specific number of states in the way that unilateral, bilateral, 
trilateral and universal do:  ‘Multilateralism suggests ‘many’ actors, but is unspecific as to what number constitutes 
many. ‘Many’ could refer to anything from a minimum of three actors to a maximum of all’. 
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Third, members of a collectivity expect ‘a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and 
over time’ (Ruggie 1992: 571; see also Keohane 1986).  Diffuse reciprocity underpins the 
hypothesis  that multilateralism helps solve problems of  coordination on which transaction 
costs  are  high  and  states  are  mostly  indifferent  to  outcomes  (such  as  on  international 
telephony  or  river  transport).  When  international  problems  demand  coordination, 
governments are happy to lose today as long as there is the prospect of winning tomorrow.  
But  only  rarely  can multilateralism be expected to solve  collaboration problems, such as 
those of collective security, when governments have grave fears about the consequences of 
‘losing today’.  Diffuse reciprocity also helps explain why powerful states, while invariably 
choosing  institutions  that  serve  their  interests,  may  find  that  multilateral  arrangements 
become more attractive to them as they value the future more highly.    
For Ruggie (1992), international orders, regimes and organisations could be multilateral in 
form, but need not be.  An international regime might not operate on the basis of indivisibility: 
the United States or United Kingdom have ‘particularistic interests’ within the International 
Organization  of  Securities  Commissions  (IOSC),  which  promotes  sound  regulation  of 
securities markets.  These interests make any collectivity that groups them together with 
(say) Albania, Serbia, or Tanzania in this issue-area a very unrestrictive one.  Put simply:  for 
an international organisation to qualify as a case of multilateralism, it coordinates relations 
among states on the basis of organizing principles.  In principle (if not always in practice), the 
same rules apply to all.  
Here, modern multilateralism differs from earlier versions:  the same rules might apply to all 
states, but states are not the only actors that partake in multilateralism (see Keck and Sikkink 
1998;  Cooper 2002 and Hampson 2003; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Jones and Coleman 
2005).  Non-state actors – multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, and 
the secretariats of IOs – may push states to make multilateral commitments or even agree to 
such  commitments  between themselves.   One  recent  example  is  agreement  by  airlines 
within their trade association, the International Air Transport Association, to cut net emissions 
by 50 per cent from 2005 levels.10  It is also notable that the G20 actually consists of 19 
states:  the EU is its 20th member.  
Alternatively, non-state actors may act as roadblocks to new multilateral agreements, such as 
on  climate  change,  or  even  seek  to  scupper  existing  cooperation  as,  for  example,  on 
10 See IATA (2009) ‘A global approach to reducing airline emissions’, available from 
http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/DADB7B9A-E363-4CD2-B8B9-
E6DEDA2A6964/0/Brochure_Global_Approach_to_Reducing_Aviation_Emissions_280909.pdf (accessed 15 
November 2009).  
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whaling.  In  any  event,  non-state  actors  ‘have  become  progressively  more  assertive  in 
demanding a  voice  at  the top decision-making tables’ (Thakur  2002:  270).   21st century 
multilateralism is not an exclusively intergovernmental phenomenon.
Whatever actors are involved, the question of what makes multilateralism effective inevitably 
arises.  Martin (1992) observes that multilateral  organisations vary both in  the degree to 
which they are effective and institutionalised:  ‘one may be strong, the other weak’ (Caposaro 
1992: 602).  Multilateral organisations may also be forums where actors become socialised 
to the principles of multilateralism:  the admission of China to the WTO might be a case in 
point.  Multilateralism can be a means, a tool or a strategy to achieve other goals, such as 
good governance, migration control, or economic liberalisation.  
But multilateralism is not a panacea.  Smith (2010) demonstrates how it can have odious 
effects:  adherence to the ‘same rules for all’ within the UH Human Rights Council – with  
European support - led to the toleration of human rights abuses, to the discredit of both the 
UN and EU.  There is empirical evidence to suggest that dictatorships that practice torture 
are more likely to accede to the multilateral UN Convention Against Torture than dictatorships 
that do not (Vreeland 2008).  Martin (1992) concedes that multilateralism may not always be 
the  most  efficient  means  to  promote  international  cooperation.  Thinking  retrospectively, 
Kahler (1992: 707) insists that multilateralism can be a chimera:  
The  collective  action  problems  posed  by  multilateral  governance  were 
addressed  for  much  of  the  postwar  era  by  minilateral  great  power 
collaboration disguised by multilateral institutions and by derogations from 
multilateral principles in the form of persistent bilateralism and regionalism.
Naím’s (2009b) more contemporary (and positive) view is that ‘minilateralism’, which seeks to 
develop cooperation only between the states that really  matter in an issue-area,  is often 
more effective than inclusive multilateralism involving all  or most states.  If  the goal is to 
promote development in Africa, the states vital to the task and their number might be different 
than, say, those required to strike a multilateral agreement on nuclear proliferation.  To give a 
concrete  illustration  of  where  minilateralism  makes  sense,  it  might  be  argued  that  it  is  
ludicrous to give land-locked Luxembourg or the Czech Republic a say on EU fisheries policy 
that is equal to that of maritime states such as France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
In summary, numerous attempts have been made to define the essence of multilateralism 
while still allowing for its nuances and limitations.  Meanwhile multilateralism has flourished in 
practice.  In the roughly 30 years after 1970, the number of international treaties more than 
tripled,  leading  to  a  significant  increase  (by  about  two-thirds)  in  international  institutions 
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(Ikenberry  2003:  536).  The  subsequent  decade  brought  the  birth  of  the  G20, 
multilateralisation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and radical enlargement of the 
EU.  Yet,  there  still  exists  no  single,  accepted  definition  of  multilateralism,  let  alone  a 
coherent, conceptually-driven research programme to investigate it.  
In fact, multilateralism may be most clearly understood when we consider what it is not. It is 
not unilateralism, bilateralism or (arguably, see below) inter-regionalism.  It  contrasts with 
imperialism,  or  cooperation  based  on  coercion,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Warsaw  Pact. 
Multilateral cooperation is voluntary.  It is not entirely ad hoc:  it is based on rules that are  
durable and (at  least  potentially)  affect  the behaviour  of  actors that  agree to multilateral 
cooperation. Ultimately, all interpretations stress three main dimensions:  
1. the importance of rules; 
2. inclusiveness in terms of the parties involved or affected; and 
3. voluntary cooperation that is at least minimally institutionalised.  
As such, multilateralism in its modern, 21st century guise may be defined as:  
Three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalised international  
cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to  
all states.
All competing definitions agree that multilateralism, at minimum, involves a minimum of three 
actors (usually states).  Critics might argue that this is to set the bar too low.  But there are 
imaginable cases of multilateralism that could have major impacts on IR involving only a few 
actors,  which  need  not  all  be  states.   Major  international  agreements  –  on  emissions 
reductions, regulatory cooperation, and rights for workers – might involve, even necessarily, 
non-state actors.  Consider what might be accomplished in terms of industry retrenchment 
and the embrace of green technologies by cooperation between just 3 actors (only 1 of which 
is a state):  the US, the EU, and the automobile industry.11  
Our  definition  specifies  that  participation  in  multilateral  cooperation  must  be  voluntary. 
Dependency theorists could pose hard questions about whether it is innately coercive for the 
same  rules  to  apply  to  all,  powerful  as  well  as  weak  states,  even  leaving  aside  the 
concessions frequently  made to Great  Powers.  Nonetheless,  our  definition  assumes that 
most, if not all, international actors have real choices when they decide whether or not to 
partake in multilateral cooperation.
11In fact, the ‘automobile industry’ is not a single industry, despite considerable cross-investment by both American 
and European manufacturers.  Any agreement on regulatory cooperation would logically require the consent of 2 
automobile associations:  the (American) Alliance of Automobile Association and the European Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association (known as ACEA).  
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On institutionalisation, we must hedge our bets. By definition, all multilateral cooperation is 
essentially institutionalised.12  That  is,  it  may  or  may  not  spawn  tangible  international 
organisations, with headquarters, staffs, and delegated powers.  The G20, as one example, 
employs no permanent staff.  But there is no question that policy cooperation within it has 
become institutionalised in that it is governed by norms and principles.
We argue that the same rules must apply, by and large, equally to all:  generally and for the 
most part, all  states must play by the same rules.  When the UN agrees a resolution, it  
applies equally to all  states.  But only five states enjoy permanent membership and veto 
power on the UN Security Council.  Moreover, participants in multilateral cooperation may not 
be states.  Non-state actors do not possess sovereignty under international law, the ability to 
sign treaties, or a monopoly on the use of force.  Thus, by definition, the same rules that 
apply to states in multilateral cooperation cannot apply to them.  
Plenty of cases of modern multilateralism apply rules differently to different states.  As we 
demonstrate,  claims  that  today’s  multilateralism  is  more  binding,  rules-based,  and 
demanding than past versions have genuine substance.  But the ‘old’ multilateralism – with 
its opt-outs, derogations, and special privileges for Great Powers - lives on in the UN, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and elsewhere.  Our definition therefore reflects caution 
about claims of a ‘new’, stronger, 21st century multilateralism.  
Different Contexts
In the broadest sense, research on multilateralism must investigate time and space. That is, 
a  research  programme  must  include  examination  of  both  the  historical  evolution  of  the 
international order and the dimensions of that order – determined by the distribution of power 
and patterns of interdependence – at any given time. It may also have to depart from the 
strictures  of  most  IR  theory  and  investigate  sub-systemic  political  space:  politics  at  the 
domestic level of individual states — especially Great Powers — that have eased or stymied 
multilateralism in different historical eras.  As Ruggie (1992: 592) argues, ‘a pronounced shift 
toward multilateralism in economic and security affairs requires a combination of fairly strong 
international forces and compatible domestic environments’. Here, we can offer only the most 
truncated raw material  for an investigation of the conditions that have encouraged states 
12By ‘essentially’, we mean fundamentally, inherently, intrinsically and necessarily institutionalised:  rules must 
exist that are durable and (potentially) affect the behaviour of actors even if parties to an agreement only meet 
once and no administration exists to ensure enforcement.  
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(and, recently, non-states) to embrace or reject multilateralism. But we show that research on 
multilateralism cannot be ahistorical or neglect political space at multiple levels. 
 
The Birth of Multilateralism
Multilateral agreements have sprung up through history mainly to manage relations between 
states  in  areas  where  interdependence  is  inescapable.  As  early  as  the  17th century, 
multilateral  arrangements  were  proposed  to  manage  property  issues,  such  as  the 
governance of oceans.  Multilateral cooperation, however, was relatively rare until the 19 th 
century, which witnessed a surge of new treaties on (inter alia) trade, river transport and 
public  health.   The  International  Telegraph  Union,  the  Universal  Postal  Union  and  the 
International Office of Public Hygiene all had their origins in the 1800s. 
19th century multilateralism was spurred by the political, social and economic transformations 
generated by the Industrial Revolution.  Rising volumes of international transactions not only 
increased the scope for disputes between states.  They also prompted states to protect their 
sovereignty, even as they agreed to common rules to facilitate economic exchange.  
Most multilateral agreements in the 19th century did not generate formal organisations.  The 
most important, the Concert of Europe, was an almost purely informal framework in which 
four European powers — Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia (later joined by France) — 
agreed to consult and negotiate on matters of European peace and security.  The result was 
peace in Europe for nearly forty years.  However, the Concert was imposed by statesmen on 
docile publics. Its legitimacy was gravely damaged by the revolutions of 1848 and the surge 
in nationalism they generated.  The Concert never became a truly multilateral organisation. 
But it paved the way for 20th century multilateralism by establishing that issues of peace and 
security could be addressed in international fora, and by recognizing the special roles, rights 
and obligations of Great Powers. 
Wilsonianism and the League of Nations
In contrast  to prior  forms,  multilateralism in  the early  20 th  century yielded multiple  formal 
organisations.  Multilateralism thus was transformed.  It came ‘to embody a procedural norm 
in its own right — though often a hotly contested one — in some instances carrying with it an 
international  legitimacy  not  enjoyed  by  other  means’  (Ruggie  1992:  584;  emphasis  in 
original). 
The  advocacy  of  Woodrow  Wilson  was  crucial  in  this  transformation.  The  only  political 
scientist  ever  to  serve as  US President,  Wilson’s  Fourteen  Points,  presented to  the US 
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Congress  in  January  1918,  urged  the  creation  of  ‘a  general  association  of  nations’. 
Wilsonianism thus became a doctrine that prescribed the spread of democracy, free trade 
and strong international law to create an international order that ‘would replace older forms of 
order based on the balance of power, military rivalry and alliances […] power and security  
competition would be decomposed and replaced by a community of nations’ (Ikenberry 2009: 
12;  see  also  Mead  2002).  Specifically,  Wilson  championed  an  international  body  with 
universal membership, binding rules and a dispute settlement mechanism.  He studiously 
avoided use of the term ‘collective security’.  However, intense negotiations, mainly between 
the British and Americans at Versailles in 1919, focused on precisely this issue.  
The result was the League of Nations.  Its Covenant committed member states not only to 
the renunciation of war, but also to accepting ‘the understandings of international law as the 
actual rule of conduct among Governments’.  Article 10 of the Covenant's preamble required 
members ‘to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all  Members of the League’. States were threatened by 
political and economic sanctions if they resorted to war, with force used only as a last resort. 
In  no  sense  did  the  League’s  Covenant  find  universal  approval.   Its  collective  security 
provisions were the primary reason for the US Senate’s rejection of American membership. 
Wilson  himself  was  pivotal  in  establishing  the  conditions  for  negotiations  on  a  new 
international  system  based  on  collective  security  with  the  League  as  a  mechanism  for 
dispute resolution.  But he failed to coax the domestic political conditions required for US 
entry (see George and George 1964; Cooper 2002).  
The League was disbanded in 1946.  It failed, first, because membership was not universal: 
the US never joined and major players such as the Soviet Union and Germany withdrew. 
Second,  the  League  faced  multiple  crises  during  an  economic  depression  and  became 
deeply  unpopular  in  a  number  of  countries  including  Germany.  Finally,  the  League’s 
Covenant was plagued by loopholes, ambiguity, and over-ambition (Armstrong  et al 2004: 
29).   Precisely  why the League failed continues to be debated. But factors rooted in the 
domestic, as well as the international, level of political space were central to its demise. 
Postwar Multilateralism
Whatever  its  failings,  the  League  of  Nations  was an essential  precursor  to  international 
institution-building  after  1945.   In  less  than  a  decade,  multilateral  accords  creating  the 
Bretton Wood agreements and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the UN, 
and NATO were agreed.  Why such a ‘spike’ in multilateralism?  Central to any explanation is 
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the role of the emergent  hegemonic power,  the US, and its leaders,  particularly Franklin 
Roosevelt. For the US, ‘multilateralism in its generic sense served as a foundational principle 
on the basis of which to reconstruct the post-war world’ (Ruggie 1992: 586). For weaker 
states,  multilateralism  thus  not  only  promised  benefits  but  also  constrained  a  hegemon 
(Ikenberry 2003).
When work began on the UN Charter,  it  was clear that  it  would be a collective security 
organisation  and thus follow in the steps of the League.  However,  past  traumas coaxed 
consensus on the need to recognise the privileged role of Great Powers.  Offering the US, 
Soviet Union, France, the UK and China permanent membership on the UN Security Council, 
and  thus  effectively  a  veto,  not  only  marked  a  return  to  balance-of-power.   It  also 
acknowledged  the  necessity  of  unanimity  among  major  powers  as  a  prerequisite  of 
multilateral cooperation.  Decisions of the Security Council – effectively, a  directoire - were 
equally binding on all UN members.  Unlike the League, the UN's role extended to economic 
and social affairs and human rights. 
The  US also  threw  its  weight  behind  the  creation  of  a  multilateral  economic  system.  It 
became clear during the Second World War that only multilateral cooperation could act as an 
antidote to the protectionism of the 1920s and 30s.  New multilateral agreements were thus 
struck on a stable exchange rate system, a reserve unit of account (the gold standard), and 
the reduction of trade barriers, 
Crucially, bipartisanship on foreign policy between the two major US political parties emerged 
during the war and persisted after it ended.  It was nurtured assiduously by the White House: 
Roosevelt  took  Republicans'  reservations  about  the  UN  seriously  enough  to  work  to 
incorporate them in the Charter.  Two pillars of the foreign policy of his successor, Harry 
Truman, were that a stable and prosperous Europe and a rules-based international economic 
order were central to US interests. In the end, the Marshall Plan and GATT enjoyed broad 
bipartisan support (see Ikenberry 2003; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007).  The domestic politics 
of multilateralism thus shifted in the US, albeit in response to international changes.      
The Cold War also ushered in a new and unprecedented international context. On one hand, 
tensions between the US and the Soviet Union permeated the entire UN system, making 
unanimity between major powers difficult,  often impossible, to achieve.  On the other, the 
construction of the iron curtain convinced Washington to support the creation of NATO in 
1949,  with  an  attack  on  one  member  treated  as  an  attack  on  all.  But  the  American 
commitment  to  multilateralism was not  doctrinal.  No multilateral  security  agreement  ever 
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materialised  between  the  US  and  East  Asian  states,  with  the  US  preferring  bilateral 
agreements with Japan and South Korea.  
It is not impossible to imagine a different post-war US approach.  As one of two dominant  
powers, the US could have shunned multilateral commitments and intimidated its Western 
allies  into  submission.  Equally,  as  Martin  (1992:  787)  argues,  weaker  allies  in  a  bipolar 
system might have threatened to exit their alliance to ‘create incentives for a dominant power 
to  accept  smaller  benefits  in  exchange  for  long-term  growth  and  stability...[since]  the 
credibility of threats to exit determines the long-term costs and benefits of multilateralism’. 
Yet,  there was never a credible threat that West European allies would exit  the alliance, 
leaving  aside  the  special  case  of  France  and  NATO.   By  the  same  token,  within  the 
multilateral institutions it had championed, the United States was always ‘unlikely to give up 
long-term gains for short-term gains at the expense of its allies’ (Martin 1992: 787; see also 
Weber 1992).
  
Multilateralism, Unipolarity and Globalisation
When the Cold War ended, many predicted that the international system would shift towards 
multipolarity,  thus  undermining  multilateralism.  However,  ‘[w]hat  the  1990s  wrought  is  a 
unipolar America...more powerful than any other great state in history’ (Ikenberry 2003: 538). 
Many expected the US to eschew multilateralism.  Yet,  Washington gave crucial  political 
backing to the development of new multilateral economic agreements including the WTO and 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).  It also was instrumental in the ‘robust 
multilateralism’ that  was embraced,  and the complex  division of  labour  between multiple 
international organisations that emerged, in response to war in the Balkans (Talbott 2008: 3). 
It was at least ‘permissive’ of a process of considerable strengthening of the UN’s systems 
for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid (Jones and Forman 2010).
In other areas – including arms control, environmental affairs and some human right issues - 
US support  for  new multilateral  initiatives  ranged from patchy  to  nonexistent.   After  the 
Republican Party captured control of Congress in 1994, multilateralism became a ‘wedge’ 
issue used to seek partisan advantage,  with  Republicans insisting  ‘that  the [Democratic] 
Clinton  administration's  penchant  for  multilateralism  was  compromising  US  sovereignty’ 
(Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007: 25). The bipartisan consensus crucial to US support for post-
war multilateralism crumbled quickly.  
Partisanship became even more entrenched during the administration of George W. Bush. 
Many of its top officials openly aired their mistrust of international institutions, and the US 
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reneged  on  a  range  of  multilateral  commitments  (see  Feith  2008).   Still,  questions  of 
multilateralism dominated US foreign policy debates.  Future historians may concur with a 
senior  American diplomat:   ‘the Bush administration’s  failing has not  been its  instinct  for 
unilateralism and its disdain for multilateralism.  Its failing too often has been how poorly it 
has practiced multilateralism’ (Ross 2008: 5).  
In  any  event,  the  2000s  witnessed  rapid  advances  in  interdependence  spurred  by 
globalisation.   The internationalization  of  financial  regulation,  diseases,  and the threat  of 
catastrophic terrorism created fresh demand for multilateral solutions.  As generic comments 
on  multilateralism  go,  Ikenberry’s  (2003:  540)  comes  as  close  as  any  to  unchallenged 
veracity:  ‘as global interdependence grows, so does the need for multilateral coordination of 
policies’.  
Multilateralism through Time and Space
Our review of the evolution of multilateralism over time and space has analogies to Waltz’s  
(1999)  claim  about  neorealism:   it  tells  us  a  few,  important  things  without  pretence  to 
anything more.  The first is that consistent patterns in the development of multilateralism are 
elusive, leaving aside how rising interdependence – as during the Industrial Revolution or 
modern era of globalisation – increases demand for multilateralism.  Even here, there are 
caveats:  advances in multilateralism have been reversed (as seen by the demise of the 
Concert  of  Europe)  and variable  between  issue-areas.   Second,  in  defiance  of  most  IR 
theory, multilateralism clearly  thrives or  dies as a consequence of  alignments at  multiple 
dimensions of political space.  Multilateralism was transformed into a form of cooperation 
with more legitimacy than other forms in the 20th century because of systemic changes:  it 
was embraced both because it was inclusive – in the case of the UN - and exclusive – in the 
case of NATO.  Yet, multilateralism has been spurred or stymied through history by changes 
at the sub-systemic level of domestic politics, such as the revolutions of 1848 or postwar 
bipartisanship  in  US  politics.  Third  and  finally,  economic  crisis  appears  to  advance 
multilateralism:  for example, the Bretton Woods agreements could be viewed as a delayed 
response to the Depression and the demonstrable failure of economic nationalism.  Yet, the 
WTO was created in absence of any deep economic slump.  Whether the financial crisis of 
2008 and beyond yields a strengthening of multilateral institutions such as the G20 remains 
an open question.  It is one among many hypotheses about multilateralism that cry out for 
empirical testing.
16
Different Goals  
If much about the evolution of multilateralism remains ambiguous, it is clear that the different 
goals that  lead  states  to  embrace  it  condition  what  form it  takes.   Here,  we  encounter 
elephant  in the room-type questions.  Have  universally accepted norms and principles of 
multilateralism ever existed?  Do they exist now?  If so, what they are?  Can multilateralism 
be effective even if  states have different  goals for cooperation?  What explains variation 
between different issue-areas?
A first  step  in  answering  such  questions  is  to  consider  how  different  IR  theories  view 
multilateralism (see table 1).   Realists  of all  stripes contend that  states inevitably pursue 
different objectives when they agree to multilateral cooperation because they are driven by 
incompatible interests.  International institutions are either weak or act to obscure hegemonic 
control, as in the cases of the IMF or Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Interdependence is increasing 
but  remains  a  weak motivator  of  state  behaviour  (Waltz  1999).   Any notion of  a  ‘global 
consensus’ on multilateralism is a myth.  
For  their  part,  institutionalists  assume that  the  goal  of  multilateralism is  to  solve  shared 
problems. Globalisation generates wealth and (sometimes) inter-cultural understanding.  But 
it  also  creates  problems  that  states  cannot  solve  by  themselves.   Thus,  they  create 
international institutions that act as focal points for bargaining and help ensure that they keep 
their commitments to one another (Keohane 1990).  
Perhaps ironically, many constructivists would agree with realists that since multilateralism is 
an –ism, it is ‘an ideology “designed” to promote multilateral activity’ (Caporaso 1992: 601). 
Where  they  differ  is  on  how  much  IR  can  be  transformed  by  multilateralism,  with 
constructivists viewing it as truly transformative (see Wendt 1999).  Neofunctionalists would 
go  even  further  in  viewing  multilateralism  as  inherently  normative.   Just  as  European 
integration  has  seen  one  act  of  new  cooperation  become  a  springboard  for  the  next, 
multilateralism begets more multilateralism:  that is its goal (see Rosamond 2005).
Table 1. Theoretical Models of Multilateralism
Theoretical 
Perspective
neorealist liberal 
institutionalist
constructivist neo-
functionalist
radical/critical
/3rd world
Model of 
Multilateralism
weak 
(hegemony)
cooperative /
functional
normative integrative dependent
Critical  or  dependency  theorists  reject  any  suggestion  that  multilateralism  promotes 
international harmony:  its purpose is to exploit the weak.  Most multilateral organisations 
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have  had  their  rules  written  by  a  sub-group  (often  hegemonic)  of  the  eventual  latent 
membership.  Differences in rules (IMF) or equivalence in rules (WTO) expose the rhetoric of 
multilateralism as concealing dependency (Gill 1997).  In short, different theoretical positions 
yield very different views about the basic objectives of multilateralism.
A second  step  is  to  consider  whether  universality  is  precluded  by  different  functional 
objectives  in  different  issue  areas.   The  question  is  central  to  multiple  debates  about 
multilateralism.  One is about  whether we can resort  to economistic  models to describe, 
explain and predict why and when multilateralism emerges:  should we expect the ‘supply’ of 
multilateralism to be responsive to demand for it?  Surely, it depends on the issue-area.  
Regulatory cooperation illustrates the point.  A flurry of activity in the early 1990s between the 
US and EU led to speculation that these two economic giants could create a ‘transatlantic 
economic space’.  Within it, economic exchange would no longer be hampered by different 
regulatory regimes. Eventually, regulatory policy cooperation would be multilateralised, with a 
progressively larger number of states embracing it (see Pollack 2001).  One effect would be 
to  sustain  claims that  ‘bilateralism is  not  the  opposite  of  multilateralism,  but  an  efficient 
component’  in  building  it  through  ‘dyadic  diplomacy’,  especially  between  Great  Powers 
(Verdier: 439).  
In practice, the results of transatlantic regulatory policy cooperation have been modest (see 
Peterson and Steffenson 2009; Pollack and Shaffer 2009).13  A major reason why is that both 
the EU and the US have powerful, autonomous, and strong-willed regulatory agencies.  Most 
consider  international  cooperation  to  be  a  far  lower  priority  than  providing  ‘high  quality’ 
domestic regulation.  Thus, even in areas where there is powerful demand for cooperation — 
particularly  from  large  multinationals  that  do  business  in  both  markets  —  it  has  not 
materialised. Caporaso (1992: 612) presages this result: ‘A great deal of intragovernmental 
coordination and power would be required to tailor regulatory policy to the specifications of 
foreign trade...I  am sceptical  about  generalizing the conditions of  economic exchange to 
multilateral settings’.  
As a third step, debates about the trade-off between inclusiveness and effectiveness must be 
confronted.  Is  regionalism — often viewed as on the march globally (Fawcett 1996; Telo 
2001;  Acharya  and Johnston  2007)  — compatible  with  a  more  multilateral  world?   Is  it  
hypocritical  for  states,  such as those of  the EU, to seek ‘an ever closer union’ between 
13 As a partial caveat, Young (2009: 682) concludes that ‘rather being characterised by conflict or co-operation…
the transatlantic regulatory relationship is really one of tolerance, in which the vast majority of regulatory 
differences are not resolved, either amicably or through litigation’.
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themselves while also seeking to promote multilateralism globally?  More generally, how can 
the ideal number of parties to any multilateral agreement be determined?  Is minilateralism 
more effective than universal multilateralism?  
Theoretical  work  on solving cooperation  problems suggests potential  answers  via  the  ‘k 
group’ solution  (Orbell  et  al 1991).  Cooperative  solutions  are  frequently  behaviourally 
dependent on a consensus within a large ‘n’ group.  But ‘n’ often exceeds the number of 
states needed to produce an optimum result, which could be agreed far more easily within a 
sub-set ‘k’ group.  To return to an earlier example, a solution to the over-fishing of European 
waters requires agreement by land-locked EU states even though they have no resources 
(coastal waters and fishing fleets) to contribute to the common good of conserving fish stocks 
(besides convincing their citizens to eat pollack instead of cod).  
Naím  (2009b)  posits  that  relatively  small  k groups  could  solve  problems  of  nuclear 
proliferation or poverty in Africa.  Mattoo and Subrahmanian (2009) argue that the large ‘n’ 
Doha round of the WTO would do almost nothing, even if it succeeded, to solve the  real 
problems of trade in the 21st century:  fluctuating commodity prices, financial instability, the 
insecurity of middle class workers, and environmental insecurity.  They propose a Bretton 
Woods II, based on institutionalised cooperation by  k groups in specific issue-areas and a 
sharing of  tasks between international  organisations,  to  tackle  the new multilateral  trade 
agenda.  
The mini-  v.  multilateral  dilemma plagues the EU itself.   A Union of  27 states illustrates 
Caporaso’s (1992: 607) injunction that ‘the smaller the k group, the easier it is to cooperate 
but  the  less  multilateral  the  arrangement  would  be.   The  larger  the  k group,  the  more 
multilateral  the  cooperative  arrangement  might  be  but  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  pull  off  
cooperation’.  Arguably, the EU’s present ‘n’ of 27 is larger than the k group needed to solve 
most European cooperation problems.  The same dilemma is illustrated by the G20.  The 
financial  crisis of  2008-10 muted concerns about  its inclusiveness.   The urgent  need for 
economic policy cooperation made determining the k group (the G20’s members represent 
80 per cent of the world economy) a relatively simple matter.  But should the G20 become a 
major institution for economic policy cooperation, cries of  directoire are certain to be heard 
from excluded states.
Ruggie (1992: 574) argues that ‘the multilateral form should not be equated with universal 
geographical  scope:  the  attributes  of  multilateralism characterise  relations  within  specific 
collectivities that may and often do fall short of the whole universe of nations’.  But he offers 
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little  guidance about  how to find the  k group or whether  regionalism — especially  deep 
regionalism of  the European kind — is  compatible  with multilateralism.   The EU itself  is 
committed, at least rhetorically, to exporting its own habits of peaceful, deep cooperation to  
other regions and seeking to agree inter-regional cooperative agreements between itself and 
its  ‘clones’.  One  hopeful  scenario  is  that  ‘the  new  regionalism,  with  EU  support,  could 
represent an open “post-modern” model of a “renewed international system’’’(Smith 2008: 
108).  The project of ‘renewing’ the international system points us back to the need to study 
how goals determine form in the design of multilateralism.  And, surely, inter-regionalism, and 
what  determines  its  success  or  failure,  must  feature  in  any  research  programme  on 
multilateralism.  
Different Forms 
If  multilateralism is to be conceptualised,  a first step is to classify its different  forms.  IR 
scholarship often resorts to obfuscatory classifications that fail to capture what is distinctive 
about multilateralism.  For example, a scheme that classifies different modes of international 
governance as ‘soft’ (the UN General Assembly), ‘medium’ (the WTO or IMF) or ‘hard’ ends 
up  concluding  that  a  ‘hard’  Great  Power  coalition  is  most  effective  because  it  has 
‘unparalleled legitimacy’ (Rosecrance 2008: 107).  On the contrary, multilateralism involves 
rules, norms, principles, and reciprocity that bestow on it more legitimacy than other forms — 
especially hegemonic — of international cooperation.14
An alternative  view presents  institutionalised,  crystallised,  and aspirant  multilateralism as 
distinct  ideal  types  (see  Table  2).   Rules-based  organisations  such  as  the  WTO reflect  
institutionalised multilateralism.  New international norms, rules and organisations - such as 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), more active international judicial intervention, or efforts 
to tackle climate change – are examples of crystallising multilateralism:  they are ‘becoming’ 
as opposed to ‘being’, and are still  not fully established.  The emergence of international 
norms on child labour or foreign investment reflects aspirant multilateralism:  ‘norms inform 
foreign policy behaviour in the absence of codified rules or even the prospect of establishing 
them’ (Peterson et al 2008: 8-9).   
14 As Zartman and Touval (2010:  8) sum, ‘[t]he philosophy of multilateral cooperation…confers legitimacy as one 
of its benefits, more so than unilateralism or bilateralism, although it does so at the expense of efficiency and 
possibly even of effectiveness’.
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Table 2. Forms of Multilateralism
Institutionalised Crystallising Aspirant
Characteristics rules-based 
international 
organisations are 
established
new international rules 
and organisations are 
in the process of being 
established
norms inform foreign 
policy behaviour in 
the absence of any 
formally-codified 
rules
Examples •WTO • judicial intervention 
and the ICC
• climate change post-
Kyoto
• child labour
• foreign investment
Source: Peterson et al 2008: 9
In exploring different forms of multilateralism, a central concern must be compliance or non-
compliance (that is, violation of rules).  As such, we inevitably are drawn to scholarship on 
international law.  It helps us confront debates about whether 21st century multilateralism is 
more binding and demanding than earlier forms, thus creating stronger incentives for states 
— especially Great Powers — to resist it.  
Most debates about international law distil to a single question: does it actually influence the 
conduct  of  states,  including  their  compliance  behaviour?  The  traditional  view  is  that 
international  law (both treaty and customary law) directly affects  the behaviour of states: 
‘state conduct that is consistent with international law must necessarily have been caused by 
international  law’  (Glennon  2005:  964,  see  also  Hathaway  and  Lavinbuk  2006).  States 
recognise a juridical obligation to follow agreed international rules or law.  They thus conform 
to the norm: ‘[t]he rule and the rule alone’ affects the behaviour of states (Glennon 2005: 
965).
 
Rationalist  legal  scholars  are  more  circumspect.  Goldsmith  and  Posner  (1999,  2005) 
question whether international law is an independent  force affecting states’ behaviour,  or 
whether it emerges from states acting rationally to maximise their interests. In other words, 
‘the rule does not cause states’ behaviour, it reflects their behaviour’ (Goldsmith and Posner 
2005: 3).  
For their part, constructivists insist that multiple factors determine state behaviour and that 
the evolution  of  social  norms shapes both the development  of  international  law and the 
conduct of states (see Finnemore 1996; Reus-Smith 2004; Glennon 2005; Hathaway and 
Lavinbuk 2006).  International law is thus a social structure of IR that is deeply influenced by 
non-legal (or sub-legal) norms:  ‘[f]or a variety of reasons, policy-makers in a given state may 
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well determine that in certain circumstances it is in the state’s interests to honour a given 
norm even though that norm is not considered binding’ (Glennon 2005: 961). 
Wherever  else  they  differ,  scholars  working  at  the  interface  of  IR  and  international  law 
broadly agree that compliance is a pivotal feature of multilateralism (see Koh 1997; Byers 
1999; Hathaway 2002; Glennon 2005).  Its evolution is shaped, in particular, by violations of 
agreements.  Excessive violation of a rule, whether embodied in norms or a treaty, occurs 
when a sufficient number of states decide that the benefits produced by the violation of a rule 
offset potential costs (Glennon 2005: 940).  If enough states adopt the negating behaviour, 
the behaviour ceases to be a violation. In effect, the rule is replaced by no rule.  Guantanamo 
Bay,  abuses  at  Abu  Ghraib,  and  extraordinary  rendition  of  terrorist  suspects  are  recent 
examples.  Russia,  Japan  and  Italy  have  also  resisted  complying  with  international 
agreements, most notably in the domain of environmental relations (see Chayes 2008). The 
question is whether multilateral agreements and their rules are changed by such violations. 
Have these violations been excessive to the point where rules and norms have lost their 
obligatory character? 
These examples reflect the fundamental ambiguity or ‘desuetude’ of multilateralism, drawn 
from the Latin term desuescere, meaning ‘to become disaccustomed to’ (see Glennon 2005: 
942).   Ambiguity inevitably arises when states give conflicting signals as to whether they 
remain bound by a rule.  Such ambiguity cannot be dismissed even by those who claim that 
a  ‘new’  multilateralism  has  emerged  in  the  21st century,  which  is  more  binding, 
institutionalised, and demanding for states.  What is really new may be thornier, and possibly 
unprecedented problems of compliance.
Tougher Rules, New Multilateralism?
Over time, a rich variety of scholars have claimed to have uncovered a ‘new multilateralism’ 
(Camps and Diebold 1983; McRae and Hubert 2001; Ikenberry 2003).  Prominent among 
them is Robert Cox (1997), whose five-year project on ‘Multilateralism and the UN System’ 
criticised  state-centric  approaches  to  multilateralism  and  the  priveleges  offered  to  Great 
Powers.  The project yielded an unapologetically normative typology that assigned causal 
significance to an emergent  global  civil  society  (Cox 1997;  see also Krause and Knight 
1995).  
More recently, Ikenberry (2003; 2006; 2009) has argued that there is something truly new 
about 21st century multilateralism:  it is more demanding and necessitates more concessions 
on the part of states.  Previous forms were more accommodating to Great Powers, offering 
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more  reservations,  exemptions,  veto  powers  or  weighted  voting  mechanisms.   Such 
provisions  were  widely-accepted  means  for  increasing  the  number  of  signatories  to 
multilateral treaties and agreements.  The old multilateralism offered relatively unthreatening 
cooperation.  
In  particular,  vehement  criticism  of  the  United  States  (US)  for  its  insistence  on 
accommodation  mechanisms may be viewed as  indicative  of  a  new multilateralism (see 
Patrick and Forman 2002; Ignatieff 2005; Jones and Forman 2010; Muldoon et al 2011).  For 
Chayes (2008: 51),  the ‘freedom to impose [reservations and exemptions] has become a 
sine qua non for American treaty ratification’.  Washington has been by no means alone in 
seeking to qualify its commitments.  But the type and scope of provisions it  has sought, 
repetitively  and almost  systematically,  sets  it  apart  (Koh  2003;  Moravcsik  2005;  Chayes 
2008). 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a case in point.  In negotiations on the ICC’s Rome 
Statute,  the US delegation  sought  permanent  exemptions and reservations  for  American 
soldiers.  It focused on Article 12, which sets out the Court’s jurisdiction,15 claiming that it did 
not recognise the special role that the US plays as a military power that shoulders risks and 
responsibilities providing global public goods, such as peace and stability (Scheffer 2001; 
Mayerfeld 2003).  Other parties argued that granting exemptions to the US would sacrifice 
the Court’s underlying premise of non-selective enforcement of justice:  the sine qua non of 
multilateralism.  Where would the line be drawn if one exemption were granted?    
Despite dissatisfaction with the Statute, President Bill Clinton (2000) finally signed it on the 
last possible day for signature, stating that the US would ‘remain engaged in making the ICC 
an instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come’.  But he also made clear 
that more work had to be done on the Statute before US ratification could be considered.  In 
May 2002,  just  two months  before  its  entry  into  force,  the  Bush administration  officially 
‘unsigned’ the treaty and declared that the US did not intend to become party to it.
The ICC has been described as a ‘newer style of multilateralism in which the scope of the 
agreement is universal and the binding character is law-based and anchored in international 
judicial  authority’  (Ikenberry  2003:  542).   States,  including  major  powers,  are  asked  to 
embrace the principle of non-selective enforcement of justice with fewer qualifications than in 
the past.  However, the Rome Statute does contain exceptions, including the possibility of a 
seven year exemption for the prosecution of war crimes.  Although only two states (France 
15The full text of the Rome Statute may be found at:  http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html(accessed 14 March 
2010).
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and Colombia) requested the exemption, its mere existence suggests that some of the old 
multilateralism lives  on.   Moreover,  the  ICC’s  limited  jurisdiction  –  dealing  with  dramatic 
violations of human rights such as genocide and crimes against humanity – make it difficult to 
consider it illustrative of any wider pattern of multilateral cooperation.  
International  trade  offers  another  testing  ground  for  claims  of  a  new  multilateralism. 
Historically, the US has championed trade agreements, including the GATT and the WTO. 
The GATT worked on the basis of consensus, which implied no special treatment for major 
powers.  In fact, it allowed ‘weak states to block positive-sum outcomes that they deemed to 
have  an  inequitable  distribution  of  benefits’  (Steinberg  2002:  345).  The  preference  for 
consensus  reflected  the  dynamics  of  the  Cold  War,  the  accession  of  a  large  bloc  of 
developing countries in the 1950s, and the widely-held view that ‘it would be impossible to 
reach agreement on a weighted voting formula and expand the GATT into a broad-based 
organisation that could attract and retain developing countries’ (Steinberg 2002: 345; see 
also Curzon and Curzon 1973; Porges 1995). 
The WTO thus appeared to mark a step-level change when it was created as the GATT’s 
successor in 1995 (see Wilkinson 2000). According to its Disputes Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), states became legally obliged to deliver on the terms of sanctions that were assessed 
against them. The WTO thus became a poster child for the new multilateralism.  
In  fact,  non-compliance  with  WTO rules  has been a  frequent  practice  of  major  players, 
including the US and the EU.  Undeterred, advocates of a new multilateralism argue that 
non-compliance in the international trade area is fundamentally different than, for example, 
gross violations of human rights.  As Trachtman (2007: 127) observes, the rules of the WTO 
are ‘not like the international law proscription of genocide or aggressive war: [they do] not 
normatively demand compliance at all costs’.  
Nevertheless, violation of WTO rules by some members can have severe impacts on others. 
In a sense, the DSU was designed to accommodate states affected by non-compliance. It 
operates on the ‘consensus minus 1’ principle, so that a state found to be violating WTO 
rules can be sanctioned and legally obliged to offer remedies to aggrieved states.  It thus 
demands compliance from states with agreed international rules with more force than did the 
GATT.  But the WTO is a less clear-cut case of the new multilateralism than is sometimes 
claimed.
Similarly,  arms  control  agreements  have  displayed  features  of  both  the  old  and  new 
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multilateralism.  The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was ratified by the US Senate in 
1997 only after it added 28 conditions to the treaty’s resolution of ratification. Their inclusion 
in  a treaty that  was originally  designed to prohibit  any exceptions prompted other states 
including India, China and Japan also to add reservations (Chayes 2008: 54).  
In  contrast,  the Ottawa Convention on landmines is  an unusually  pure  case of  the new 
multilateralism. Again, the US demanded changes and exceptions, including a geographical 
exception for the use of landmines in Korea and a definition of landmines that would allow 
the use of mixed-system anti-tank mines.  The US delegation also asked for a deferral period 
for compliance, as well as the right to withdraw during periods of armed conflict (Wareham 
1998: 234-235). Nearly all the US proposals were dismissed after most signatories insisted 
that  the  treaty  should  have  no  exceptions.   In  December  1997,  122  states  signed  a 
convention  categorically  prohibiting  the  use,  stockpiling,  production  and  transfer  of  anti-
personnel mines.  
Other recent arms control cases reflect a similar aversion to exceptions and reservations. 
They include a convention on cluster munitions and negotiations on the creation of a global 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) covering international transfers of conventional arms. On balance, 
modern arms control appears to confirm the shift towards a new multilateralism.
The debate about  whether  multilateralism is  advancing in  a  secular  fashion is  ultimately 
about whether we are witnessing a process of convergence towards an essentially single, 
binding and more demanding form.  On one side, sceptics argue that form follows function: 
the new multilateralism is considerably more visible on arms control than it is on trade, even 
leaving aside human rights. On the other, the emergence of more institutionalised and rules-
based  agreements  sustains  the  argument  that  we  are  moving  towards  a  new,  more 
fundamentally multilateralised international order.  
Different Meanings
  
Claims  that  the  international  order  is  becoming  progressively  more  multilateral  are 
challenged  by  different  cultural  visions  of  multilateralism.  Consider  ‘sovereignty-based’ 
multilateralism, which is frequently cited by Chinese policy-makers as a normative objective 
(Xinbo  2009:  68).  The  1997-8  Asian  financial  crisis  opened  eyes  in  Beijing  to  how  far 
economic  interdependence had progressed in  the region.  Subsequently,  China both  took 
active, specific steps to help stabilise the region’s economies and shifted more generally 
towards ‘enthusiastic embrace of multilateral  diplomacy’ (Gill  and Green 2009:  20).   This 
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stance has shapes Chinese foreign policy choices in a regional context in which ‘East Asian 
governmental regionalism has grown dramatically in the past few decades’ (Kang 2007: 72). 
Other major powers now seize on China’s wish to be seen to embracing multilateralism, as 
illustrated in comments by Timothy Geithner,  the US Treasury Secretary,  on a new early 
warning mechanism agreed by the G20 to warn of  excessive trade deficits:   ‘It’s  a very 
pragmatic  approach,  a  very  multilateral  approach…it  allows  China  to  point  to  a  set  of 
multilateral commitments.’16  
Equally,  however,  Chinese  enthusiasm  for  multilateralism  is  firmly  based  on  the 
understanding that  domestic  matters,  such as human rights  in  China,  are nobody else’s 
business.  A flourishing of new Asian initiatives – the region now hosts about 100 multilateral  
groupings – owes much to Chinese support.  Yet, the main focus of most scholars of Asia 
remains explaining why the region exhibits an ‘”organisation gap” – a paucity of multilateral 
organisation’ compared to other regions in the world (Calder and Fukuyama 2008: 1).  Asia is 
still home to intense nationalism, raw territorial disputes, and far more ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural  diversity  than  –  say  –  Europe.   China’s  political  and  economic  rise  might  well 
manifest itself in multilateral leadership in the region, but ‘both Hobbes and Kant are alive 
and well in Asia’s multilateral process, and neither can claim dominance over the region’s 
future’ (Gill and Green 2009: 13).  
Multilateralism  Chinese-style  contrasts  with  what  is  often  considered  to  be  gospel  in 
Washington:  ‘any multilateral order is a sham— the strong do what they like while the weak 
talk and establish institutions’.17  American realists, such as Kagan (2002), claim that there 
exists a distinct, American-style multilateralism that is merely ‘a cost-benefit analysis, not a 
principled commitment  to  multilateral  action  as the cornerstone of  world  order’.   In  fact,  
multilateralism is  viewed differently  by different  American political  tribes,  and even within 
them.  One  outlook  —  by  no  means  exclusive  to  Democrats  or  Republicans  —  sees 
multilateralism as a route to democracy promotion and the emergence of a ‘liberal peace’ 
(Doyle  1986;  Cox  et  al  2000).  In  a  sense,  this  view  underpinned  the  George  W.  Bush 
administration’s  commitment  to ‘transformational  diplomacy’ (see Jervis  2006;  Rice 2007; 
Ikenberry et al 2009).  Perhaps ironically, the question of whether Bush was, in practice, ‘the 
heir of Woodrow Wilson’, became a debating point by the end of his administration (Ikenberry 
2009: 1).  Equally, the commitment of Bush’s successor, Barack Obama to a ‘new spirit of  
multilateralism’  was  severely  compromised  when  moves  to  join  the  UN  Human  Rights 
Council  and increase the US financial  contribution to the IMF were met with widespread 
domestic political  opposition (see Morris 2009; O’Conner 2009).   What these cases may 
16 Quoted in Financial Times (UK edition), 9 November 2010, p.6.
17John Van Oudenaren (2007) ‘Containing Europe’, RSS: American Future, available at: 
http://americanfuture.net/?page_id=142 (accessed 12 July 2007).
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illustrate is that political salesmanship of multilateralism involves nuance and ambiguity about 
its likely  results,  and Washington politics  is  (mostly)  ‘intolerant  of  nuance and ambiguity’ 
(Freedman 2008: 506).  
Even when Washington politics allows a US administration to commit itself to multilateralism, 
structural factors may constrain American behaviour. As an (allegedly) hegemonic power, the 
US faces the challenge of rendering its commitment to multilateralism credible (Karns 2008). 
Is the US attitude towards multilateralism based on assumptions about the desire of other 
states to shackle American power?  Realists would contend that such assumptions outlast 
any administration.  
Of course, the US has provided leadership in the creation of the UN and the WTO, plus the 
Summit of the Americas, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the enlargement 
of  NATO.  Nevertheless,  the US Senate’s two-thirds majority  hurdle for treaty ratification 
remains a powerful  obstacle to the new multilateralism (Cowhey 1993; Karns and Mingst 
2002;  Lyman  2002).    Perceptions  of  threat  and  vulnerability  post-9.11  have  prompted 
aggressive American behaviour in negotiations on arms control, container security, and the 
handling  of  data  on  airline  passengers  (Price  2005).  Yet,  one  (surprising)  result  was 
‘substantive cooperation’ on counterterrorism within APEC (Gill and Green 2009: 7).  Again, 
multilateral  cooperation  varies  considerably  between  different  issue  areas.  Generally, 
however,  American  exceptionalism  must  be  a  focus  for  any  research  programme  on 
multilateralism.
So must the question of whether multilateral cooperation encourages non-democratic states 
to adopt democratic habits.  Cooperation of any kind may not be possible with China on 
North Korea, Iran, or Asian security if the US or EU puts democratisation at the centre of its  
policy.   Multilateral  cooperation  between  non-democracies  is  always  unlikely  to  promote 
democracy.  Keohane (et al 2009) claim to have uncovered the empirical conditions under 
which multilateralism leads to net gains in democracy.  But they also insist on the need for far 
‘more comprehensive analysis of the effects of multilateralism on democracy’ (Keohane et al 
2009: 28).  Such analysis also must be comparatively cultural.
Because both multilateralism and democracy are understood differently in different cultures, 
Europe’s cultural commitment to multilateralism bears scrutiny.  By one view, it is deeply-
rooted  in  the  experience  of  the  Union’s  history  and  institutions.  But  it  may  well  be  the 
opposite of universal.  We may even find different cultural understandings of multilateralism 
in different EU member states.  To illustrate, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, argued 
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in 2009 that the problem of climate change could be solved only if states were willing to ‘give 
up powers  to  multilateral  organisations,  whatever  the  cost’.18 But  it  is  an open question 
whether her view was shared by her (say) Polish or Czech counterparts.  Germany’s strong 
support for multilateralism even contrasts with France’s commitment to a foreign policy that 
seeks (somehow) to combine ‘preeminent multilateralism, autonomous regional groupings, 
and unapologetic nationalism’ (Bowen 2005: 95; see also Moreau Defarges 2004).  Different 
cultural understandings of multilateralism within the EU may help explain why, in the words of 
former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, ‘nothing divides us more than Russia’.19
Russia itself may have developed a distinct cultural understanding of multilateralism as part 
of  a shift  towards a Czarist  ‘sovereign democracy’.   Moscow’s view could be seen as a 
product of symbiosis between Vladimir Putin’s iron rule and the return of Russia to something 
approaching Great Power status. As Kagan (2008: 55) puts it, ‘strength and control at home 
allow Russia to be strong abroad.  Strength abroad justifies strong rule at home.  Russia’s  
growing international clout also shields Putin’s autocracy from foreign pressures’.
What  room  could  there  be  in  this  equation  for  Russia  embracing  multilateralism?  The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) reveals that there is room.  Formally created in 
2001, the SCO brings Russia together with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia have observer status.  The June 2009 SCO 
summit was hailed by the Russian President,  Dmitry Medvedev, as an opportunity for its 
participants (which included Brazil in trade discussions) to ‘build an increasingly multipolar 
world  order’.  Multilateral  economic  policy  cooperation  within  the  SCO  could  be  used, 
according to Medvedev,  to  undermine an ‘artificially  unipolar  system [based on]  one big 
centre of consumption, financed by a growing deficit, and thus growing debts, one formerly 
strong reserve currency, and one dominant system of assessing assets and risks’ (quoted in 
Hudson 2009: 9).  
The Obama administration sought to attend the June 2009 summit as an observer, but was 
rebuffed.  The summit deliberately sought to expand trade between major economic players 
in way that offered no role for the US or its currency.  The importance of the goals in shaping 
multilateralism is reflected in a Russian worldview that insists ‘we have reached our limit in  
subsidizing the US military encirclement of Eurasia while also allowing the US to appropriate 
18Quoted in ‘Germany’s foreign policy:  a new game of dominoes’, The Economist (UK edition), 14 November 
2009: 49.
19Mandelson made the comment to a meeting of the General Affairs Council (of EU Foreign Ministers) in July 
2006.  Interviews, Directorate-General for Trade, European Commission, Brussels, 10-11 September 2006.
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our exports, companies and real estate in exchange for paper money of questionable worth’ 
(Hudson 2009: 9).    
The SCO’s remit has expanded from a narrow focus on border stabilisation between China 
and its Asian neighbours to cooperation on economic and energy issues, water rights and 
(especially) action against the ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism, and terrorism.  A 2005 
SCO declaration calling for the US and its allies (although not naming them) to set a date for 
the withdrawal of their military forces from ‘the territories of SCO member states’, at a time 
when  several  thousand  American  troops  used  bases  in  Uzbekistan  and  Kyrgyzstan  as 
platforms for action in Afghanistan, caused alarm in Washington and other western capitals.20 
Yet,  fears  that  the  SCO  is  developing  into  an  anti-western  alliance  capable  of  genuine 
collective action, as opposed to summit declarations, seem at least premature.  Thus far, it 
has been mostly hamstrung by Chinese-Russian rivalry (Cooley 2009).
Still, the SCO surely merits further study. It is a case in which multilateralism is certainly not a 
‘weapon of the weak’.  It also suggests that we are some distance away from any universal, 
cross-cultural understanding of multilateralism.  
Conclusion  
Our sub-title reprises the words  of  Rodney King,  whose brutal  beating  by police  officers 
triggered the 1992 Los Angeles riots.  It points to a double entendre.  First, can IR scholars 
‘get along’, accept a modern definition of multilateralism, and pursue a research programme 
that leads to its conceptualisation? Second, is there sufficient  will  and agreement on the 
virtues of multilateralism amongst the world’s political elite to sustain a process of further 
multilateralisation of the global order?  
We have seen that multilateralism has been defined and understood in different ways.  We 
concur with Ruggie (1994: 556) that ‘there is unavoidable ambiguity in defining this term’. 
Scholarship on multilateralism still suffers from a lack of an agreed conceptual framework, an 
common language, and set of references with which to examine its development.  
Yet, as we have argued, multilateralism is both distinctive and more than just a sub-set of 
cooperation.   Even  if  claims  of  a  new  multilateralism  cannot  always  be  validated, 
20In fact, Uzbek President Islam Karimov eventually set his own date for withdrawal of US forces – likely with the 
active encouragement of Beijing and Moscow - in response to the Bush administration’s criticism of Uzbekistan’s 
dreadful human rights record.  
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multilateralism in practice has outpaced efforts to understand it.  Our analysis of the main 
factors that  condition multilateralism - different contexts, goals, forms, and meanings – has 
raised far more questions than it  has answered because so many basic questions about 
remain unanswered.   They include:
• When  is  multilateralism  not a  weapon  of  the  weak?  Historically,  under  what 
circumstances have Great Powers embraced it?
• What determines what type of multilateralism emerges in any specific era or issue-
area?  Does  the  specific  type  of  multilateralism  that  emerges  depend  on  what 
objectives are being sought?  
• What determines how many states are parties to a multilateral agreement?  Can we 
demonstrate empirically that minilateralism is advancing more quickly and is more 
effective than inclusive multilateralism?
• Can  inter-regionalism  be  a  means  to  the  end  of  extending  and  deepening 
multilateralism?  If  so,  under  what  conditions?  Or  does  it  inevitably  undermine 
multilateralism?
• What is really new about 21st century multilateralism? Is the ICC a ‘rogue case’? Will 
the post-2008 financial crisis yield more and stronger multilateralism? What is the role 
of non-state actors in modern multilateralism?  
• Is Ikenberry (2003: 540) right that ‘demands for multilateral agreements — even and 
perhaps especially by the United States - will increase’? Is American exceptionalism 
unassailable or surmountable?   
• Is there evidence of an emergent, cross-cultural understanding of multilateralism in 
the 21st century? Precisely  what  accounts for  different  understandings in  different 
cultures,  and what are the differences (as revealed, say, by discourse analysis of 
government foreign policy documents and media portrayals)?
• Under what circumstances has multilateral cooperation encouraged non-democratic 
states to adopt democratic habits? How is the trade-off between inclusiveness and 
democracy promotion best-managed in the design of new multilateral agreements?  
To be clear, there is much in the existing literature on which such a research programme can 
build,  including  the  three  essential  features  of  multilateralism.   The  first  is  generalised 
principles of conduct. Consider the case of Russia’s attempt to agree a declaration in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation condemning the US role in the 2008 conflict in Georgia. 
It  was  quietly  shelved  when the  Chinese  delegation  made clear  that,  in  their  view,  the 
proposal was inconsistent with the basic teleology of the SCO. Thus, a generalised principle 
was established:   geopolitical  disputes would  not  distract  the SCO from its  core  task of 
confronting the ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism, and terrorism.  
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Indivisibility  — in some form  — is  a second,  minimum condition of  multilateralism.  The 
stalling of the Doha Development Round illustrates. Emerging states blocked agreement on 
the  grounds,  broadly  speaking,  that  the  costs  and  benefits  were  not  spread  equitably 
between all parties in any settlement that had been proposed.
Diffuse reciprocity also continues to be a defining condition of multilateralism.   Parties to any 
multilateral agreement must be prepared to lose today, and remain a party that agreement, 
on the grounds that they might win tomorrow. In other words, cooperation must be minimally 
durable — that is, institutionalised — to be called multilateralism.  
If we can agree what constitutes multilateralism, we can begin to answer the questions we 
have posed, particularly one that trumps all others:  is the international order becoming, in a 
secular and durable way, more multilateralised?  Debates about whether we are witnessing a 
transition to a more multilateral international order persist, not least because of disagreement 
about what constitutes compliance and whether international laws or norms have tangible 
impact on the behaviour of states. There are good reasons to be pessimistic about the future 
of multilateralism, but also evidence that multilateralism is expanding and deepening in the 
21st century.  We still  do  not  seem to  understand  why with  much  precision.   It  is  worth 
investment  of  time  and thought  into  considering  whether,  how and why one of  the ugly 
ducklings of IR might one day emerge as a useful, perhaps even beautiful, swan.
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